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Case No. 20100818-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
SAUL CRISTOBAL,
Def endant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault in concert
with two or more persons, a second degree felony, :r \,,.;..nor. >•,
Ann. t 7t-5- IlL M \ \ W 2I I'M), Ul.-ih Code An
tiii.l

c

.
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felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101 (West Supp. 2009). This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2010).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion under rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence, in admitting evidence of Defendant's gang affiliation where such
evidence was directly probative of the elements of the charged crimes.
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Standard of Review. "Whether evidence is admissible under rule 403 is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, If 34,
250 P.3d 69. A trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 403 "will be
overturned only if the trial court's 'determination... is beyond the limits of
reasonability.'" State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168,116,

P.3d

(citation

omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Evid. 401
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Utah R. Evid, 402
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Utah R. Evid. 403
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West Supp. 2009) ("Criminal responsibility for
direct commission of offense or for conduct of another")
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2009) ("Offenses committed in
concert with two or more persons — Notice — Enhanced penalties")
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) (Aggravated assault)
Utah Code Ann, fi 76-9-101 (West Supp. 2009) (Riot)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1
Defendant, codefendant Lonny High, and an unknown third man
together attacked two brothers, Desidero and Emilio Maciel. Having
encountered the brothers twice before on the Provo River Trail, the attackers
waited until the third encounter to beat them with a club and grapefruitsized rock.
"I want a cigarette."
Desidero Maciel and his friend Dakota were traveling by longboard
along the Provo River Trail at night. R. 171:177-78. Defendant, codefendant
Lonny High, and an unknown third man ran to catch Dakota; Defendant
grabbed Dakota, pulling him off his longboard. Id. at 178,180,181. The
cohorts surrounded Dakota, and Defendant demanded a cigarette. Id. at 178,
180. One of the men suggested leaving, but Defendant insisted: "No, I want a
cigarette." Id. at 180. Dakota offered to roll a cigarette for Defendant, but
discovered he had no rolling papers. Id. at 181. Desidero and Dakota then

1

Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, | 3, 243 P.2d
1250.
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left. Id. at 181. The encounter lasted approximately three to four minutes. Id.
at 180.

*
"What you looking at?"

Later that night, Desidero alone passed through the same area of the
trail and again encountered the men who had previously accosted him and
Dakota. Id. at 182. Desidero glanced at the group, and one of them (possibly
Defendant) said in a threatening tone, "What you looking at?" Id. at 182-83.
Desidero sped away on his long board. Id. at 183.
i

"There might be trouble/'
Desidero called his brother Emilio Maciel, who was close by, and the
brothers met to go home together. Id. at 130. Desidero told Emilio of his
encounters with Defendant s band and said "There might be trouble." Id. at
130. Desidero suggested returning home by a different route but, not
sensing the danger, Emilio insisted on returning along the trail. Id. at 131,
133,158.
As Desidero had expected, Defendant and his cohorts began following
the brothers along the trail. Id. at 133-34. The third man crossed paths with
Emilio, saying "What up Vato?" Id. at 155. This man whistled, apparently as
some sort of signal to the other two. Id. at 149,155. In response, Defendant
and High approached the third man and the brothers. Id. at 149. Emilio
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'

asked, "Why are you following us?" Id. at 134. Desidero stated, "You're the
people that stopped me before." Id. When Defendant or one of his
companions threatened, "You better take your home boy home," the brothers
agreed to leave. Id. at 134,173,206. But as the brothers continued along the
trail, and the three men continued to follow. Id. at 134. Emilio told the men,
"Don't follow us." Id. Desidero then stated to Emilio that the group were
"wannabe gangsters." Id. at 134; 188.
Defendant then picked up a grapefruit-sized rock, and looked as if he
were going to throw it at Desidero. Id at 135-36,159,185. But instead of
throwing the rock, Defendant and the third man "rushed" Desidero. Id. at
136,185. A "split second" later, High started throwing punches at Emilio. Id.
at 136,160, 200. Emilio kneed and pushed High aside to run to his brothers
aid. Id. at 140.
As Defendant and the third man attacked Desidero, Desidero quickly
fell to the ground and did not fight back. Id. at 187,188. The third man beat
Desidero a stick or club. Id. at 162,186-87. Defendant hit Desidero in the
head with the rock. Id. at 162,185-86,199. Defendant and the third man
repeatedly beat Desidero with the stick and rock. Id. at 186.
After Emilio broke free from High, he pulled the third man off
Desidero. Id. at 140. Desidero escaped from Defendant and picked up his
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longboard to use for self-defense. Id. at 187. The third man hit Emilio in the
head with the stick. Id. at 140. The three men then fled. Id. at 143,200. As
they fled, the men flashed gang signs and shouted "PVL." Id. at 143. Both
brothers suffered head injuries. Id. at 144-46,186.
Defendant and High each testified that they participated in the fight in
self-defense. See generally R. 172:275-340.
"It's just a gang."
PVL is a street gang, whose name means " Provo Varrios Locotes," or
as translated by High, "Provo Neighborhood Crazies." Id. at 304,305. Both
Defendant and High admitted having been members of PVL. Id. at 299, 317.
They both claimed, however, that Defendant had cancelled his membership
in the gang two or three months before the assault. Id. at 299, 304, 317. High
claimed that Defendant did not "want to be affiliated with us. He didn't
want no involvement in none of our activities." Id. at 305.
Over Defendant's objections, the trial court allowed Defendant and
High to be questioned about the nature of PVL. See, e.g., id. at 305-06. High
testified that PVL is "just a gang;" that PVL exists to do "graffiti and stuff;"
that PVL has territorial boundaries in Provo; that PVL has "conflicts with
rival gangs," meaning "fights;" and that "fighting and stuff" and a tendency
to bravery and aggression raises one's status within the gang. Id. at 306-07.
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The criminal case.

Defendant and High were charged with two counts of aggravated
assault in concert with two or more persons, each second degree felonies;
riot, a third degree felony; and obstructing justice, a class A misdemeanor.
R.l-2. Defendant and High were tried together. During trial, the State filed
an amended information eliminating the obstruction charge. R. 97-98. The
State then moved to strike one count of aggravated assault, to conform with
the evidence presented. R. 172:354. The jury convicted Defendant and High
of the two remaining charges/aggravated assault in concert with two or more
persons and riot. R. 164. Defendant timely appealed. R. 169.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant challenges the trial court's discretionary ruling admitting
evidence of his gang membership and the basic nature of the PVL gang. He
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, because its probative value was
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. Rule 403 allows, but
generally does not require, trial courts to exclude evidence if the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Because the
High also appealed. See case number 20100668-CA.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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challenged evidence here has high probative value and a low risk of unfair
prejudice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The admitted gang evidence was highly probative for three reasons:
first, it was relevant to whether Defendant committed an assault in concert
with two or more persons, an element of the charged offense; second, it
rebutted Defendant's claim of self-defense by explaining his possible motives
for initiating the attack; and third, it aided the jury in understanding the
circumstances of the attack.
The gang evidence bore little risk of unfair prejudice because it did not
prompt the jury to decide on an improper basis, such as hatred or horror.
Rather, the evidence allowed the jury to decide the case only upon the facts
of the crimes themselves. A trial court's balancing of evidence's
probativeness against its danger of unfair prejudice is highly fact dependent
and discretionary, and Defendant has not demonstrated an abuse of that
discretion.
But even if the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting the
gang evidence, any error was harmjiess. Reversal is warranted only if, absent
the evidence, there is a substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
Other record evidence, unchallenged on appeal, would have signaled
Defendant's gang involvement to the jury, and the jury had sufficient other
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(

evidence of Defendant's guilt. Thus, Defendant has not shown that without
the challenged evidence the jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt.
Without such a showing, any error in the trial court's evidentiary ruling is
harmless.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ADMITTING THE GANG EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT IS
DIRECTLY RELEVANT AND ITS PROBATIVE VALUE FAR
OUTWEIGHS ANY DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE.
Defendant brings only one claim on appeal, arguing that the trial court
abused its' discretion by admitting evidence of his gang affiliation and the
nature of PVL itself. See Br. Aplt. at 7. Defendant argues that the gang
evidence runs afoul of rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, in that the
" probative value of the gang-related testimony is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice/' Id. The trial court acted well within its
discretion to admit the evidence because the evidence was directly relevant
to the charges at issue, explained the circumstances and motive for the crime,
rebutted Defendant's claim of self-defense, and did not urge the jury to
convict on some improper ground other than the guilt of the accused.
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that "[a]ll relevant evidence is
admissible/7 Utah R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any
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tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. However, relevant "evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Utah R.
Evid. 403 (emphasis added).
Under rule 403, the court "indulge[s] a presumption in favor of
admissibility." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1222 (Utah 1993). "Rule 403
does not require a trial court to dismiss all prejudicial evidence because all
effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party
against whom it is offered." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, | 53,191 P.3d 17
(quotations, citation and alteration omitted). "Rather, the rule only requires
that the trial court measure the danger the evidence poses of causing 'unfair
prejudice' to a defendant." Id. "'Unfair prejudice' within [the context of rule
403] means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis
. . . . " State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 1989).
A. The gang evidence is highly probative of the issues before the
jury.
In context of the issues before the jury, the gang evidence Defendant
challenges was directly and highly relevant. Indeed, Defendant himself
concedes that the evidence was relevant; he argues only that it was "slightly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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<

probative/7 See Br. Aplt. at 10. To the contrary, the gang evidence was highly
probative in assisting the jury in arriving at a decision upon a proper basis.
Thus, the evidence's probativeness far outweighed any danger of unfair
prejudice. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Admissibility of evidence of
accused's membership in gang, 39 A.L.R. 4th 775 (1985) (citing cases dealing
with admissibility of gang evidence, and concluding that "[g]ang
membership has frequently been found to be probative and admissible").
The gang evidence in this case had direct relevance to the issues at trial
for three reasons: first, it was relevant to prove Defendant acted in concert
with two or more persons, an element of the charged offense; second, it
rebutted Defendant's claim of self-defense by explaining his possible motives
for initiating the attack; and third, it aided the jury in understanding the
circumstances of the attack.
1. The gang evidence was relevant to show Defendant acted
in concert with two or more persons.
First, Defendant was charged with committing aggravated assault in
concert with two or more persons in violation of Utah Code sections 76-5-103
(aggravated assault) and 76-3-203.1 (providing enhanced penalties for
committing assault in concert with two or more persons). Section -203.1
provides:
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i

(l)(a) A person who commits [aggravated assault] is subject to an
enhanced penalty for the offense . . . if the trier of fact finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or more
persons.

*

(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons
in committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or
encouraged, and each of the other persons:
(i) was physically present; or
(ii) participated as a party . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2009).
i

Section 203.l(l)(a) requires that the factfinder — in this case, the jury —
determine whether Defendant acted in concert with two or more persons.
And section 203.1 (l)(b) requires the jury to make determinations regarding a
defendant's awareness of the others aiding him. Thus, the gang evidence at
issue here directly addresses the findings the jury was required to make
under the enhancement provisions of section 203.1. See also United States v.
Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996,1007 (7th Or. 1997) ("Evidence of gang affiliation is
admissible [under rule 403] in cases in which it is relevant to demonstrate the
existence of a joint venture or conspiracy and a relationship among its
members.").
Defendant and his cohorts belonged to PVL, a street gang whose
purposes included street fighting, and whose members rewarded bravery
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and aggressive behavior. Further, this specific gang had on other occasions
engaged in fighting rivals. This evidence makes it more likely that Defendant
committed this assault in concert with other members of his gang, and that
he was aware that they all had the same purposes in fighting. Thus, the
evidence Defendant complains of is directly and highly probative of the
crimes he was charged with and the specific findings the jury had to render.
2. The gang evidence was relevant to rebut Defendant's claim
of self-defense.
Second, Defendant raised a claim of self-defense at trial, alleging that
the Maciel brothers started the fight. See, e.g., R. 172:321. The parties
presented mutually exclusive versions of how the fight began, and the jury
was aided in deciding between those versions by knowing that Defendant
and his compatriots belonged to a street gang that rewarded aggression and
fighting. The gang evidence thus speaks to Defendant's motives in fighting:
(1) he would be rewarded by status and approval from his friends by
fighting; and (2) Desidero had insulted the gang members by calling them
"wannabe gangsters/' giving them a reason to retaliate.3 Having a gang5

Defendant does not argue that the gang evidence constitutes
improper character evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, nor
could he. The gang evidence is not evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or
acts/' Utah R. Evid. 404(b). In any event, motive is a proper non-character
purpose that would render such evidence admissible, even if it otherwise
constituted evidence of character. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

related motive to fight makes it less likely that Defendant merely responded
to the aggression of others, and more likely that he initiated the fight. Thus,

<

Defendant's own claim of self-defense rendered his gang membership
directly relevant and highly probative.

{

3. The gang evidence was relevant to explain the
circumstances of the fight.
Finally, the gang evidence was relevant because the circumstance of

i

the fight itself suggested gang activity, and the jury was entitled to know
who and what PVL is. The fight began after Desidero called Defendant and
•i

his cohorts "wannabe gangsters/' and ended with the men flashing gang
signs and shouting their gang name as they fled the scene.4 The companions
themselves linked their gang membership directly to the fight and wanted
their gang status to be known.
The parties could not have provided the jury a full and fair description
of events without reference to PVL, and the evidence would have been
confusing to the jury without at least a basic understanding of what PVL is.
Rule 403 "does not shield defendants who engage in 'outrageous acts' or
require the prosecution to 'sanitize its case/" nor does rule 403 "permit 'only
the crimes of Caspar Milquetoasts to be described fully.'" 1 Christopher B.
4

Defendant does not challenge the testimony that he and his
companions flashed gang signs and shouted "PVL" as they fled.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:13 (3rd ed. 2007)
(footnotes omitted).
Rule 403 allows the trial court to exclude evidence when such evidence
would lead to "confusion of the issues, or mislead[] the jury/' The contested
evidence in this case, however, has the opposite effect because its absence
would have led to confusion and would have mislead the jury. See State v.
Downs, 2008 UT App 247,114,190 P.3d 17 (evidence is not unfairly
prejudicial where it provides context and bears on defendant's credibility);
see also State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 24,25 P.3d 985 (admission of evidence of
nicknames, chants, and dances provided background for the charged crime
and was therefore properly admitted); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1141
(Utah 1989) (evidence is admissible where it is relevant to "explain the
circumstances surrounding the instant crime"); State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880,
882 (Utah 1978) (where "evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances
surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose").
The gang evidence in this case served multiple permissible purposes,
and did so with force and probity. It aided the jury in determining the
central and proper issues they had to consider, and the trial court thus acted
well within its discretion in determining that the evidence was admissible
under rule 403.
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A

B. The gang evidence posed little danger of unfair prejudice.
As stated trial court acts within its discretion to exclude otherwise
relevant evidence only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice/' Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Again,
"'[ujnfair prejudice' within [the context of rule 403] means an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis . . . . " Maurer, 770 P.2d at
984. An improper basis is commonly but not necessarily an emotional one,
"such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." State v.
Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, f 21,196 P.3d 124 (citation and quotations omitted),
cert denied, 207 P.3d 432 (2009). "Only when evidence poses a danger of
'rous[ing] the jury to overmastering hostility' does it reach the level of unfair
prejudice that rule 403 is designed to prevent." Killpack, 2008 UT 49 at 1 53
(quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, | 29, 8 P.3d 1025). Stated another way,
unfair "prejudicial evidence is any evidence that affects the trier of fact in a
manner not attributable to the permissible probative force of the evidence." 1
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of
Evidence Manual 243 (7th ed. 1998). "[T]he term 'unfair' emphasizes the point
that evidence ought not to be excluded at the mere hint of risk . . . . " Mueller
et al, supra, § 4:13.
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Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that evidence of
gang membership that directly explains the crime at issue will necessarily
cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Defendant has cited
State v. Smith,

S.W. 3d

, 2011 WL1233367 (Tex. App.). See Br. Aplt. at

10,15. But in that case, the Texas Court of Appeals determined that rule 403
prohibited introduction of evidence of gang membership because such
membership had "little probative value under the facts of this case." Id. at
*14-15. Gang membership in that case had nothing to do with the murder at
issue. See id. at *14. In other words, Smith was decided more as a matter of
relevance than as a matter of unfair prejudice. Smith is thus inapposite here
because Defendant's gang membership is directly relevant to the elements of
the charged crimes, provides Defendant's motive, and rebuts his claim of
self-defense.
. Defendant also cites State v. MMigan, 2010 UT App 152,2010 WL
2311852, for the proposition that "there may be some unfair prejudice
inherent in making the jury aware of gang affiliation/7 See Br. Aplt. at 8
(citing id. at *2). But in that case, this Court affirmed admission of the gang
evidence under rule 403 because the evidence was "highfly] probative" and
not "emphasized by the prosecutor" for irrelevant purposes. Milligan, 2010
UT App 152,2010 WL 2311852, at *2. The gang evidence in this case was
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likewise highly probative and not overly emphasized by the prosecutor other
than to show context. The challenged testimony is limited to fewer than three

<

pages of transcript within the context of a two-day trial with over 400 pages
of transcript. See R. 172:306-08. Moreover, the prosecutor did not initiate the
challenged line of questioning until after Defendant and codefendant Lonny
High raised their claim of self-defense. See id. In fact, the prosecutor did not
refer at all to Defendant's gang membership during his summation. See R.
172:371-77. Further, the trial court issued a limiting instruction regarding the
proper use of the gang evidence. See R. 132. The State thus confined its
exploration of Defendant's gang membership to its proper and legitimate
purposes and did not use the gang evidence to predispose the jury against
Defendant in any improper way.
Thus, under the cases Defendant cites, evidence of gang membership is
admissible under rule 403 if it bears directly on the facts and circumstances of
the crimes at issue. Where evidence of gang membership does not bear on
the issues of a particular case, such evidence may certainly cause unfair
prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 587 F.3d 861, 867
(7th Cir. 2009) ("Evidence of gang membership can be inflammatory, with the
danger being that it leads the jury to attach a propensity for committing
crimes to defendants who are affiliated with gangs or that a jury's negative

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

(

feelings toward gangs will influence its verdict....") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir.
1996) ("We have consistently held that, under appropriate circumstances,
gang evidence has probative value warranting its admission over claims of
prejudice. However, we have also long recognized the substantial risk of
unfair prejudice attached to gang affiliation evidence ....") (citations
omitted). Such is not the case here, and Defendant has not shown that the
challenged evidence prompted the jury to convict him for any reason other
than his guilt for the charged crimes.
But even if Defendant had shown that the gang evidence had limited
probative value and a significant risk of unfair prejudice, he has not shown
that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the probative
value was not substantially outweighed by that risk. See Utah R. Evid. 403.
The requisite balancing test necessarily rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an
abuse of that discretion. See State v. Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345, f 18, 222
P.3d 768; State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, \ 12, 95 P.3d 302. "We are
confident that Trial Judges can identify the likely harm associated with
probative evidence and can estimate its impact on the jury." Saltzburg et al,
supra, at 242. "Because Rule 403 provides that the negative factors set forth in
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the Rule must substantially outweigh the probative value, it follows that the
discretionary power to exclude should rarely be used." Id. at 259. Accord K-B

<

Trucking Co. v. Riss InVl Coiy., 763 F.2d 1148,1155 (10th Cir. 1985) ("The
exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy to
be used sparingly.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because there is little danger of unfair prejudice to Defendant, and that
risk does not substantially outweigh the high probative value of the gang
evidence, Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting the challenged evidence.
II.
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
ADMISSION OF THE GANG EVIDENCE WAS HARMLESS
Even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged
gang evidence, that ruling was nevertheless harmless error. An error is
harmless where there is "no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 1989); see
also Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Stated
otherwise, "[f]or an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict/'
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,920 (Utah 1987).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-20-

{

Defendant complains only of the evidence of Defendant's past gang
affiliation and the prosecutor's introduction of evidence regarding the nature
of PVL. See Br. Aplt. at 1,12-13. Had the trial court excluded all the
challenged evidence, however, the jury would have nevertheless heard
testimony that Defendant responded to the third man's whistle, that the three
cohorts attacked the Maciel brothers unprovoked, that Decidero considered
Defendant and his friends to be "wannabe gangsters," and that Defendant
and his friends flashed gang signs and shouted the name of a gang as they
fled the scene of the crime. Thus, the challenged evidence was merely
cumulative of other, unchallenged evidence of concerted gang activity by
Defendant and his friends. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989)
(finding harmless error when erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative
of other testimony).
CONCI USION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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